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The European monetary famine of the late Middle
Ages and the Bank of San Giorgio in Genoa
Erik Aerts
1. The Late Medieval Crisis and the Monetary Factor
Influenced probably by the dramatic events of their own period, some
scholars focused on specific crisis phenomena of the late Middle Ages already
in the thirties 1. However, the widespread belief that the economy, society,
politics, arts and even intellectual life were characterised by a general recession,
slump, contraction or even depression in the fourteenth and at least the first
half of the fifteenth century stems from the years immediately after the Second
World War 2. France, England and Germany were the first countries where
reputable medievalists discovered convincing evidence for what they considered
to be the « Krisen der spätmittelalterlichen Wirtschaft » (W. Abel), the « agony
of feudal society » (R. Hilton), the « économie contractée » (E. Perroy) or the
« age of contraction » (M. Postan). After a brief time lag similar studies
appeared in Bohemia, Belgium and Italy. In particular, major reports by
distinguished historians as M. Mollat, M. Postan, A. Sapori and Ch. Verlinden
given at the international Congresses for Historical Sciences in Paris (August-
September 1950) and Rome (September 1955) contributed to the notion, soon
to be found in every textbook, that the end of the Middle Ages coincided
with a dark period in European history. It seemed that Johan Huizinga’s
seminal hypothesis from 1919, depicting in the most sombre terms the
« Waning of the Middle Ages », could safely been confirmed and extended.
Since then the causes, character, topography, periodisation and effects of
the medieval « great depression » have been the subject of an ongoing debate 3.
———————
1 F. GRAUS, Das Spätmittelalter als Krisenzeit. Ein Zwischenbilanz, Prague 1969 (Me-
diaevalia Bohemica. Supplementum, 1), pp. 11, 12 and 14.
2 Ibidem, p. 6.
3 Good surveys are B.F. HARVEY, Introduction: the ‘Crisis’ of the Early Fourteenth Century,
in Before the Black Death. Studies in the ‘Crisis’ of the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. B.M.S.
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The result of the discussions in scholarly journals and at conferences is that
we now have a fairly clear and certainly less pessimistic view of the period
from 1300 to 1450. J. Munro reflects a widely accepted opinion when he
argues that « various data, however, reveal a pattern not of continuous
slump but of cyclical movements of booms and slumps woven around a
declining trend » 4. Not that discord and confusion have been banned
completely. Despite the impressive and still increasing number of studies
little agreement exists about the so-called « prime movers » responsible for
the secular contraction or decline. Every conceivable factor has attracted the
attention of specialists, although it seems extremely difficult to disentangle
dependent and independent variables, endogenous and exogenous mecha-
nisms or even necessary and sufficient conditions: warfare, plague and other
epidemic diseases, famine, Malthusian bottlenecks between population and
agriculture, changes in climate (the « little Ice Age »), transaction costs, pro-
perty rights, class relations and class conflicts, lack of investment, declining
productivity and even stagnation of technology 5.
Apart from these theories, a group of historians – sometimes but incor-
rectly labelled as the monetarist camp 6 – prefers a monetary explanation.
———————
CAMPBELL, Manchester-New York 1991, pp. 4-11; J. HATCHER and M. BAILEY, Modelling the
Middle Ages. England’s Economic Development, Oxford 2001 (see « The Economic History
Review », 2nd Series, 55/1, 2002, pp. 186-187), and K.G. PERSSON, Pre-Industrial Economic
Growth. Social Organization and Technological Progress in Europe, Oxford 1988, chapter 3,
pp. 63-88. Additional information, though not confined to the late Middle Ages, is to be
found in J.L. ANDERSON, Explaining Long-Term Economic Change (Studies in Economic and
Social History), Basingstoke-Hampshire 1991 and J.L. VAN ZANDEN, Een debat dat niet
gevoerd werd: over het karakter van het proces van premoderne economische groei (A debate that
was never held: on the nature of the process of pre-modern economic growth), in « Tijdschrift
voor de Economische Geschiedenis in Nederland », 8/2 (1994), pp. 77-92. Unfortunately
the interesting book Debating the Middle Ages. Issues and Readings, eds. L.K. LITTLE and
B.H. ROSENWEIN, Malden (Mass.)-Oxford 1998, has no chapters on the crisis debate of the
late Middle Ages.
4 J.H. MUNRO, Patterns of Trade, Money, and Credit, in Handbook of European History
1400-1600. Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, eds. TH.A. BRADY, H.A. OBERMAN
and J.D. TRACY, Leiden-New York-Cologne 1994, I, p. 153.
5 This is an old belief. For example, R.H. HILTON, Y eut-il une crise générale de la
féodalité, in « Annales, Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations », 6/1 (1951), p. 29 wrote that « le
taux relatif d’invention subit une chute brusque après 1300 ».
6 Not every scholar using a monetary explanation follows the ideas presented by M.
Friedman and other monetarists. After the breakthrough and successes of monetarism in the
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Roughly speaking, the set of monetary explanations can be reduced to three
arguments, although some authors combine different arguments, sometimes
even linking a monetary factor with, for example, the effects of war and
plague, commercial and agrarian changes or population 7. The oldest theory,
already noted by contemporaries in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
refers to the frequent debasements of the silver currency by the public
authorities. Such monetary manipulation, mostly reductions of the weight
or fineness of the coins and sometimes depreciations by raising the official
rate of the coins, severely damaged commerce and affected the purchasing
power of wage labourers 8. A second theory regards fluctuations of the gold-
silver ratio, linked with the introduction of bimetallism in the second half of
the thirteenth century, as the main cause for serious economic difficulties in
the subsequent centuries 9. The most influential has been the third argument
in which the worsening and prolongation of the crisis of the late medieval
economy are seen as a direct result of a decreased money supply caused by
a sharp reduction in both the stock of currency and its velocity 10.
In Italy the debate on the nature of the late medieval economy was
launched by C.M. Cipolla in 1949, who drew attention to the effects of the
“great killer”, the Black Death and compared the European crisis of the
fourteenth century with the world depression of 1929 and 1935. At the inter-
national conference on the Renaissance at Florence in 1952, A. Sapori integra-
ted part of the debate in his famous hypothesis of a new periodization for the
Renaissance. While he viewed the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in very
———————
1970s and 1980s, it now seems that new Keynesian and new classical macroeconomics have
pushed monetarism off the intellectual stage (A. RABIN, Monetary Theory, Cheltenham 2004).
7 W.C. ROBINSON, Money, Population, and Economic Change in Late Medieval Europe,
in « Economic History Review ». 2nd Series, 12/1 (1959), pp. 63-76; H.A. MISKIMIN, Monetary
Movements and Market Structure-Forces for Contraction in Fourteenth- and Fifteenth-Century
England, in « The Journal of Economic History », 24 (1968), pp. 470-490.
8 See references in notes 21 and 24 and also R. METZ, Geld, Währung und Preisentwicklung.
Der Niederrheinraum im europäischen Vergleich: 1350-1800, Frankfurt am Main 1990 (Schrif-
tenreihe des Instituts für bankhistorische Forschung, 14), pp. 26-41. A good explanation of
the mechanism is given by H. VAN DER WEE, Monetary, Credit and Banking Systems, in The
Cambridge Economic History of Europe, eds. E.E. RICH and C.H. WILSON, Cambridge-London-
New York-Melbourne 1977, V, pp. 291-292.
9 Examples are provided in J. DAY, Introduction, in Études d’histoire monétaire XIIe-
XIXe siècles. Textes réunis, ed. J. DAY, Lille 1984, p. 17.
10 See references in notes 26-34.
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negative terms, F. Melis turned the spotlight on innovations, improvements
and new developments, all related to economic expansion 11. The nature of the
late medieval Italian economy was now approached with the question rinasci-
mento dell’economia or l’economia del rinascimento? Ten years later, Italy’s
economic situation in the later Middle Ages became a central issue in Italian
historiography when Cipolla, R.S. Lopez and H. Miskimin debated the back-
ground and extent of the so-called economic depression of the Renaissance 12.
According to G. Cherubini 13 the first scholar to integrate the debate on the
late medieval crisis into the general history of Italy was R. Romano, for whom
demographic losses, falling grain prices, depreciation of the silver coins and
urban revolts by the popolo minuto were undeniable indications of an
economy in serious trouble. Although he considered these phenomena to be
indications of a major turning point in Italian economic history and even the
start of a centuries lasting recession 14, the contraction of the fourteenth cen-
tury was by no means general. There was no such thing as an overall decline
of industrial output. The woollen and linen industries in Milan and Florence
contracted after 1400, but new urban (Venice!) and rural industrial centres
flourished. Famous Florentine banks went bankrupt, but this was hardly a
proof of an economic crisis of an entire region or even country since many
small banks and firms stayed in business. R.S. Lopez, using port statistics,
argued that trade by Genoa and the Genoese economy in general decreased
substantially. E. Ashtor, however, has shown how Italians merchants penetra-
ted Levantine markets, and F.C. Lane has demonstrated how Venice became
Europe’s wealthiest city because of its increasing share in the Levantine trade 15.
———————
11 M. DEL TREPPO, Federigo Melis and the Renaissance Economy, in « The Journal of
European Economic History », 10/3 (1981), pp. 714-719.
12 F. GRAUS, Das Spätmittelalter als Krisenzeit cit., p. 21; A. HAVERKAMP and H.
ENZENSBERGER, Italien im Mittelalter: Neuerscheinungen von 1959-1975, in Historische Zeit-
schrift, Sonderheft 7, 1980, pp. 299-447 and 487-494.
13 G. CHERUBINI, La “crisi del trecento”. Bilancio e prospettive di ricerca, in « Studi Storici »,
15/3 (1974), pp. 660-670.
14 More on this is given by A. VON MÜLLER, Zwischen “Krise” und Krisen: Italiens Ge-
sellschaft um 1400, in Europa 1400. Die Krise des Spätmittelalters, eds. F. SEIBT and W. EBERHARD,
Stuttgart 1984, p. 236 and R.C. MUELLER, Die wirtschaftliche Lage Italiens im Spätmittelalter,
in Europa 1400 cit., pp. 222-223.
15 R.C. MUELLER, Die wirtschaftliche Lage Italiens cit., pp. 223-228; J.H. MUNRO, Patterns
of Trade cit., pp. 158-159.
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Therefore, it seems that the so-called crisis in late medieval Italy had the same
mild character as in the other highly dynamic growth pole of Europe,
Flanders and its neighbouring regions 16. For both regions, the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries appear to have been rather a « century of changes
and contrasts » (R.-H. Bautier) or an « âge des mutations » (J. Heers, G.
Fourquin) 17.
From the beginning Italian economic historians have shown a clear
interest in monetary factors. Already in 1948, Cipolla drew attention to the
frequent debasements of the domestic silver currency and the resulting
“profit inflation” for entrepreneurs who paid their workers in silver and
sold their finished products in gold 18. Because of this silver depreciation
and the presence of a relatively important gold stock, the Italian economy
suffered from the perturbations in the gold-silver ratio, the second argument
of the monetary expanation. But what about the third and most important
argument in the monetary theory? Was there a significant reduction in
either the money stock and its velocity or both?
Before focusing on Italy we must sketch the nature of the argument
and examine its European context.
———————
16 E. AERTS and E. VAN CAUWENBERGHE, Die Grafschaft Flandern und die sogenannte
spätmittelalterliche Depression, in Europa 1400 cit., pp. 108-115 and H. VAN DER WEE, The Low
Countries in Transition: from the Middle Ages to Early Modern Times, in The Low Countries in
the Early Modern World (Variorum), ed. H. VAN DER WEE, Aldershot–Hampshire 1993, pp.
10-17. E. THOEN, Economie rurale et démographie en Flandre pendant le bas Moyen Age et le
début des Temps Modernes, in Recent Doctoral Research in Economic History (Proceedings
Tenth International Economic History Congress Leuven, August 1990), eds. E. AERTS and H.
VAN DER WEE, Leuven 1990 (Studies in Social and Economic History, 21), pp. 31-39. The
same author, in his logical, non-quantitative model even speaks of a “curbed” or “restrained”
growth (E. THOEN, Landbouweconomie en bevolking in Vlaanderen gedurende de late
Middeleeuwen en het begin van de Moderne Tijden (Agriculture and Population in Flanders in
the Late Middle Ages and the beginning of the Early Modern Times), Ghent 1988).
17 R.-H. BAUTIER, The Economic Development of Medieval Europe, London 1971 (Library
of European Civilization); G. FOURQUIN, Histoire économique de l’occident médiéval, Paris,
1979 3 (Collection U); J. HEERS, L’occident aux XIVe et XVe siècles. Aspects économiques et
sociaux, Paris 1973 (Nouvelle Clio, 23).
18 C.M. CIPOLLA, Studi di storia della moneta, I, I movimenti dei cambi in Italia dal
secolo XIII al XV, Padova 1948 (Pubblicazioni della Università di Pavia. Studi delle scienze
giuridiche e sociali, 101).
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2. The Monetary Famine of the Fourteenth-Fifteenth Centuries
The list of historians who refuse to assign cardinal importance to mone-
tary movements and who raise serious doubts on the interference between
monetary and real factors is long. These historians (Malthusians, Ricardians,
Marxists...) simply cannot accept how money could have had a key function
in a society where agriculture employed 80 per cent of the population and
were activities in the primary sector represented an overwhelming part in
the gross domestic product 19.
Intelligent contemporary observers thought otherwise. Already in 1355
in his famous Tractatus de origine, natura, jure et mutacionibus monetarum
(« Treatise on the Origin, Nature, Law, and Alterations of Monies »), Nicolas
Oresme (1323-1382) lamented the endless cascades of debasements. In his
eyes currency debasements drove good money out of the country, seriously
hindered internal and external trade, increased inflation and the cost of living,
thereby making life much more troublesome for a great number of people 20.
Of course, Oresme lived in France, which was a real champion with respect to
debasement policies. Between 1337 and 1360, the kingdom experienced no
fewer than 85 changes of the monetary standard, most of them deteriorations.
No wonder that in 1354 the abbot of Saint-Rémi in Reims bitterly observed that
his abbey was sunk into deep poverty à cause de la faible monnaie 21. One may
———————
19 E. MEUTHEN, Das 15. Jahrhundert, München-Vienna 1980 (Oldenbourg Grundriß der
Geschichte, 9), p. 124. Good examples are E. THOEN, Landbouweconomie en bevolking cit.,
pp. 268-270 (who in less than three pages out of a total of more than 1340 dismisses monetary
variables) or G. BOIS, Crise du féodalisme. Économie rurale et démographie en Normandie
orientale du début du XIVe sècle au milieu du XVIe siècle, Paris 1976.
20 CH. JOHNSON, The De Moneta of Nicholas Oresme and English Mint Documents (Nelson’s
Medieval Texts), London-Edinburgh-Paris-Melbourne-Toronto-New York 1956. There is
a more recent French edition realised by an interdisciplinary team supervised by CL. DUPUY and
F. CHARTRAIN: Traité des monnaies (Nicolas Oresme) et autres écrits monétaires du XIVe siècle
(Jean Buridan, Bartole de Sassoferrato), Lyon 1989. A copy unknown to Johnson was kept in the
General State Archives in Brussels, Handschriftenverzameling/Manuscrits divers, 3471, but is now
preserved in the Royal Library Albertina, Handschriften/Manuscrits, IV.728. The summary of the
argument by Oresme is borrowed from P. SPUFFORD, Oresmius, Nicolaus, in Von Aktie bis Zoll.
Ein historisches Lexikon des Geldes, ed. M. NORTH, München 1995, p. 290. See also J. QUILLET,
Note sur le “Traité de la première invention des monnaies” de Nicole Oresme, in L’or au moyen
âge (monnaie-métal-objets-symbole), Aix-en-Provence 1983 (Senefiance, 12), pp. 383-388.
21 P. SPUFFORD, Münzverslechterung und Inflation im Spätmittelalterlichen und Früh-
neutzeitlichen Europa, in Geldumlauf, Währungssysteme und Zahlungsverkehr in Nord-
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also expect that contemporaries showed a particular interest in the con-
sequences in the short run but failed to notice the general trend of the long
run 22. Apart from some periods of excessive inflation (e.g., 1348-1375,
1410s-1440), the centuries 1300-1500 were characterised by deflation and
falling prices 23.
According to Oresme the « main and final cause » (principalis et finalis
causa) of the debasements had everything to do with medieval rulers who
sought to derive fiscal advantages from the coinage in their mints. However,
other explanations have been offered. Some debasements would be meant to
promote export and to induce a more favourable balance of trade, to stimu-
late dishoarding, to create profit-inflation for merchants and entrepreneurs,
or to cheapen the public debt 24. In view of the many reports and complaints
———————
westeuropa 1300-1800. Beiträge zur Geldgeschichte der späten Hansezeit, ed. M. NORTH,
Cologne-Vienna 1989 (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Hansischen Geschichte, Neue Folge,
35), p. 110.
22 E. PERROY, A l’origine d’une économie contractée: les crises du XIVe siècle, in « Annales,
Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations », 4/1 (1949), p. 178 (this study has been reprinted in
English as At the Origin of a Contracted Economy: the Crises of the 14th Century, in Essays
in French Economic History, ed. R. CAMERON, Illinois 1970, pp. 91-105).
23 J. DAY, “Crise du féodalisme” et conjoncture des prix à la fin du Moyen Age, in « Anna-
les, Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations », 34/2 (1979), pp. 308-312; J. DAY, The Fisher Equation
and Medieval Monetary History, in J. DAY, The Medieval Market Economy, Oxford 1987, p. 11;
J.H. MUNRO, Patterns of Trade cit., pp. 147 and 149; N. MAYHEW, Numismatic Evidence and
Falling Prices in the Fourteenth Century, in « The Economic History Review », 2nd Series, 27/1
(1974), pp. 1-15.
24 C.M. CIPOLLA, Currency Depreciation in Medieval Europe, in « The Economic History
Review », 2nd Series, 15/3 (1963), pp. 413-422, reprinted in Change in Medieval Society. Europe
North of the Alps 1050-1500, ed. S. THRUPP, Toronto-Buffalo-London 1988 (Medieval Academy
Reprints for Teaching, 72), pp. 227-236; R. DE ROOVER, Le Moyen Age face à l’histoire
statistique, in « Annales, Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations », 6 (1951), pp. 31-36; D. GLASSMAN
and A. REDISH, Currency Depreciation in Early Modern England and France, Vancouver 1986
(The University of British Columbia. Department of Economics. Discussion Paper 86-04), p.
28 (for the period 1500-1700); H. MISKIMIN, Money, Prices, and Foreign Exchange in
Fourteenth-Century France, New Haven-Londen 1963 (Yale Studies in Economics, 15), pp. 117
and 118; E. PERROY, A l’origine d’une économie cit., pp. 176 and 178. The best overview of the
discussion is given by J.H.A. MUNRO, Wool, Cloth and Gold. The Struggle for Bullion in
Anglo-Burgundian Trade, 1340-1478, Brussels-Toronto, 1972, pp. 14-41 (though the author
later modified an important part of his argument, he never changed his views on the cause of
late medieval debasements).
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about the scarcity of money 25, perhaps these debasements were just a way
to increase the amount of money?
Indeed, French and Belgian historians like M. Bloch 26, H. Laurent 27
and E. Perroy 28, impressed by the complaints in the sources and using some
older historiographic work 29, had, already in the early 1930s, launched the
idea of a « famine de monnaies », a « pénurie du numéraire », a « disette
monétaire »: « Tout simplement on avait le sentiment que l’économie était
véritablement handicapée par la famine monétaire » 30. By choosing the
suggestive image of a monetary famine, they made it clear that late medieval
Europe had not only its “real” famines that killed people, but also monetary
famines that made coins disappear. Since this early generation of monetary
historans could not present statistical evidence for their bold assertations,
they failed to convert their colleagues 31. The international debate, as sug-
gested in the beginning of this paper, was dominated by Malthusians and
———————
25 J.H. MUNRO, Wool, Cloth and Gold cit., p. 18; H.A. MISKIMIN, Monetary Movements
and Market cit., pp. 473-475; P. SPUFFORD, Money and its Use in Medieval Europe, Cambridge
1988, pp. 341 (note 1), 346, 347.
26 M. BLOCH, Seigneurie française et manoir anglais, Paris 1967 2 (Cahiers des Annales,
16), p. 110 (written in 1936, first edition in 1960).
27 H. LAURENT, Crise monétaire et difficultés économiques en Flandre aux XIVe et XVe
siècles, in « Annales d’Histoire Économique et Sociale », 5/20 (1933), pp. 156-160; ID., La loi de
Gresham au moyen âge, Brussels 1933 (Travaux de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de
l’Université de Bruxelles, 5), pp. VII and 6-8.
28 E. PERROY, A l’origine d’une économie cit., p. 174.
29 By E. Babelon, A. Dieudonné, A. Landry et al.
30 M. BLOCH, Esquisse d’une histoire monétaire de l’Europe, Paris 1954 (Cahiers des
Annales, 9), p. 65.
31 F. GRAUS, La crise monétaire du 14e siècle, in « Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire »,
29 (1951), pp. 452-454; M.M. POSTAN, Note, in « The Economic History Review », 2nd Series,
12/1 (1959), p. 78 (« There was thus no independent, i.e. no purely monetary, reason why the
supply of money should have failed to expand in the later middle ages »). M. POSTAN, The
Medieval Economy and Society, Harmondsworth 1972, reprint in 1981, p. 266 calls the effects
of coinage “purely subordinate”. See also the list of quotations from Postan’s publications in
J.H. MUNRO, Mint Outputs, Money, and Prices in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries,
in Münzprägung, Geldumlauf und Wechselkurse. Minting, Monetary Circulation and Exchange
Rates. Akten des 8th International Economic History Congress Section C 7 Budapest 198, eds.
E. VAN CAUWENBERGHE and F. IRSIGLER, Trier 1984(Trierer Historische Forschungen, 7),
pp. 60-62, appendix A.
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Marxists who favoured real factors and minimised the role of money or
assigned it only secondary significance. This would change when J. Day – in
1978 in the heyday of monetarism – brushed the dust off the old theory of
a monetary contraction by presenting his vigorous thesis of « the great
bullion famine » 32. Day’s arguments met with considerable scepticism from
many colleagues who blaimed him for putting excessive and exclusive
emphasis on the monetary variable, but his theory received a good deal of
support from other distinguished historians such as J. Munro 33, N. Mayhew,
P. Nightingale, M. Prestwich, M. Allen and others 34.
The theoretical fundament for those historians who accept the existence
of a monetary famine remains the quantity theory of money and more
precisely the equation of exchange as published by the mathematician I.
Fisher (1867-1947) in 1911, which is, in fact, an algebraic tautology linking
a monetary cash and stream variable to developments in the real sphere 35.
In its well-known form M V = P T the M refers to the money supply or
———————
32 J. DAY, The Great Bullion Famine of the Fifteenth Century, in « Past and Present », 79
(1978), pp. 3-54. Additional data were published by J. DAY, The Question of Monetary
Contraction in late Medieval Europe, in « Nordisk Numismatisk Årsskrift/Nordic Numismatic
Journal », (1981), pp. 12-29. Both articles are reprinted in J. DAY, The Medieval Market
Economy, Oxford 1987, pp. 1-54 and 55-71. The essays have also been translated into French
in J. DAY, Monnaies et marchés au Moyen Age, Paris 1994 (Comité pour l’histoire économique
et financière de la France) as « La grande famine monétaire du XVe siècle » (pp. 41-82) and
« Contraction monétaire et déclin économique aux XIVe-XVe siècles » (pp. 101-116). For
different meanings of bullion, see J. MUNRO, Billon-Billoen-Billio. From Bullion to Base Coinage
(An Essay in Numismatic Philology), reprinted in his Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in
England and the Low Countries, 1350-1500, Hampshire 1992 (Variorum Collected Studies Series
CS 355), no. III. In this context bullion is defined as unminted gold and silver to be brought
to the mints for coinage.
33 J.H. MUNRO, Monetary Contraction and Industrial Change in the Late-Medieval Low
Countries, 1335-1500, in Coinage in the Low Countries (880-1500). The Third Oxford Sympo-
sium on Coinage and Monetary History, ed. N.J. MAYHEW, Oxford 1979 (BAR International
Series, 54), p. 95 and also his Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction in Late-Medieval England
and the Low Countries, in Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Wolds, ed.
J.F. RICHARDS, Durham (Nort Carolina) 1983, p. 97, note 1 (this text has been reprinted in
J.H. MUNRO, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies cit., no. VI).
34 See references in notes 23, 59 and 93.
35 I. FISHER, The Purchasing Power of Money. Its Determination and Relation to Credit,
Interest and Crises, New York 1911, pp. 24-55. A new and thoroughly revised edition was
published in 1922.
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money stock (the volume of currency, mainly metallic coins, some moneta
di banco or transferable bank credits), V to the velocity of circulation (or in
the words of Fisher, « a sort of average of the rates of turnover of money »),
P to the general price level and T to the number or volume of transactions.
Within this conceptual framework, it is argued that a decline of the money
supply not only caused steady debasements, bullionist legislation and the
use of inferior coins, but also imposed serious restraints on the level of
transactions and investments, increasing in some regions the introduction
of self-sufficiency, payments in kind and other forms of barter. This drastic
fall in the money supply was the result of a complex set of factors. The
easiest of them to document is the undeniable slump in European silver and
– to a lesser extent – gold mining. In England, the output in the mines of
Devon and Devonshire was already declining in the early fourteenth
century 36. A similar decline can be noted for silver mining at Freiberg in
Saxony and for the Iglesias silver mines in Sardinia after 1345 37. The overall
reason seems to have been less the exhaustion of the mines than the occur-
rence of diminshing returns to be associated with a stagnating technology
since the Roman period. A part of the decling production may have been
compensated for by the opening of new, mainly gold, mines in Central
Europe. Of these, the rich silver veins of Kutná Hora in Bohemia, which
was opened by 1290 and ten years later was already accounting for 45% of
the European silver production, were certainly the most important. When
production at Kutná Hora started to diminish, probably already after
1350 38, the total Bohemian silver production gradually declined from an
annual figure of 20,000 or even 30,000 kg silver between 1300-1350 to some
10,000 kg in the period of 1350-1420. Between 1420 and 1460 production
ceased almost completely 39. New silver mines in Bosnia and Serbia only
———————
36 H. MISKIMIN, Money, Prices, and Foreign Exchange cit., p. 17.
37 J. DAY, The Fisher Equation cit, p. 111; ID., The Question of Monetary Contraction
cit., p. 29. The Sardinian mines closed around 1365.
38 F. GRAUS, La crise monétaire du 14e siècle, p. 452 (« Il n’y a aucune preuve dans les
sources tchèques que les mines de Kutna Hora aient produit moins d’argent qu’auparavant »)
argues that decline only occurred after 1400. See also P. SPUFFORD, Money and its Use cit., p. 343.
39 J. JANÁCEK, L’argent tchèque et la Méditerranée (XIVe et XVe siècles), in Mélanges en
l’honneur de Fernand Braudel, I, Histoire économique du monde méditerranén 1450-1650,
Toulouse 1972, pp. 245-261 and the same, České stíbro a Evropský trh drahých kovů v první
polovinĕ 14. století (Bohemian Silver and the European Market for Precious Metal in the First
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offered “a temporary palliative” as they were conquered by the Ottoman
Turks before 1440 40.
A major slump in the silver extraction of the European mines was not
the only explanation offered for the decline of the money supply. For
decades now, a number of historians such as R. De Roover, R. Lopez, H.
Miskimin and A. Watson have been pointing out that Europe in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries witnessed a large and probably increasing
deficit of its balance of payments with the Islamic world in North Africa
and the Near East 41. This deficit was mainly the result of the trade gap in the
balance of trade. A specific asymmetrical development in Europe’s income
distribution (due to frequent inheritances of land and fortune during the
epidemics and an increasing propensity to consume by some parts of the
upper classes 42) increased the import of costly luxury products such as spices,
but also glass, oil, dye-stuffs, cottons, silks (satins, velvets, damasks ...),
tapestries, perfumes, ivory, pearls, gems, and so on. The simultaneous decline
and even dramatic disappearance of cheap textiles constituting the bulk of
export-oriented production 43 probably enhanced the trade deficit. Speculative
flows also had an impact. Most European rulers and administrations in the
fourteenth century adopted a monetary policy that favoured gold. Not only
did gold have a higher symbolic value than silver, it was also a more efficient
———————
Half of the Fourteenth Century) in Historiografie Čelem k Budoucnosti. Sborník k Šedesátinám
Akademika Jaroslava Purše, Prague 1982, pp. 549-563.
40 J. MUNRO, South German Silver, European Textiles, Warfare, and Venetian Trade with
the Levant and Ottoman Empire, c. 1370 to c. 1720: a Non-mercantilist Approach to the Balance of
Payments Problem, in Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico secc. XIII-XVIII,
Prato-Firenze 2007 (Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Datini” Prato. Atti delle
“Settimane di studio” e altri Convegni, 38) (forthcoming), p. 3.
41 For an overview of the historiography: M. BALARD, Les relations économiques entre
l’Occident et le Monde islamique à la fin du Moyen Age. Quelques remarques, in Relazioni
economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico cit., pp. 7-10.
42 See references in notes 73 and 74.
43 J. MUNRO, Industrial Transformations in the north-west European textile trades, c.1290
- c.1340: economic progress or economic crisis?, in Before the Black Death cit., pp. 110-139, and
the same, The Low Countries’ Export Trade in Textiles with the Mediterranean Basin, 1200-
1600: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Comparative Advantages in Overland and Maritime Trade
Routes, in « International Journal of Maritime History », 11/2 (1999), p. 1-30; H. VAN DER
WEE, Un modèle dynamique de croissance interséculaire du commerce mondial (XIIe-XVIIIe
siècles), in « Annales, Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations », 25/1 (1970), pp. 102-103 and 109-110.
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medium of exchange and was preferred for military and diplomatic purposes.
Mint administrations in the Muslim world, however, favoured silver because
of its relative scarcity 44. From 1360 and mainly between 1420-1460, both
commercial and speculative motives generated a considerable outflow of
silver and, to a lesser extent, gold bullion to the Levant, India, the Far East
and Central Asia 45. It were the repubbliche marinare or the great maritime
republics of the mediterranean, the classical intermediaries between East and
West, that served as the principal pipelines through which Europe’s silver
was drained off 46. According to the audacious and not always consistent
estimates by E. Ashtor, merchants from northern Italy (especially Venetian
but also Genoese), Catalonia and southern France exported each year the
value of 400,000 ducats in specie out of Europe, mainly to Egypt and Syria,
the equivalent of more than 16,500 kg of silver 47. Although others have
suggested different figures 48, the order of magnitude of the export is still
———————
44 J.H. MUNRO, Monetary Contraction and Industrial Change cit., p. 100; the same, Bullion
Flows and Monetary Contraction cit., pp. 102-103 and 110-112; TH. WALKER, The Italian
Gold Revolution of 1252. Shifting Currents in the Pan-Mediterranean Flow of Gold, in Precious
Metals in the Later Medieval cit., pp. 29-52.
45 H. MISKIMIN, The Economy of Early Renaissance Europe 1300-1460, Cambridge-
London-New York-Melbourne 1981, p. 22; J. HEERS, Gênes au XVe siècle. Activité économique et
problèmes sociaux, Paris 1961 (École Pratique des Hautes Études. VIe section. Centre de Re-
cherches Historiques. Affaires et gens d’affaires, XXIV), pp. 64-65.
46 A. WATSON, Back to Gold - and Silver, in « The Economic History Review », 2nd Series,
20/1 (1967), pp. 1-34.
47 E. ASHTOR, Les métaux précieux et la balance des payements du Proche Orient à la basse
époque, Paris 1971 (École Pratique des Hautes Études. VIe section. Centre de Recherches
Historiques. Monnaies-Prix-Conjoncture, 10), p. 96; the same, Il volume del commercio
levantino di Genova nel secondo trecento, in East-West Trade in the Medieval Mediterranean,
ed. B.Z. KEDAR, London 1986 (Variorum reprints), p. 430 (300,000 to 450,000 ducats). See
also J. DAY, The Great Bullion Famine cit., pp. 6-11.
48 J. DAY, The Question of Monetary Contraction cit., p. 18 believes that only 300,000
ducats or some 12 tons of silver were exported. These figures do not take into account the
export by other merchants than Venetian. Genoese export to the Levant, however, was much
smaller than Venetian and certainly declining in the second half of the fourteenth century
(see some figures for total export values by Genoese merchants in E. ASHTOR, Il volume del
commercio levantino cit., p. 429). But even for the Venetian export different figures are quoted.
According to R.C. MUELLER, “Chome l’uciello di passagio”: la demande saisonnière des espèces
et le marché des changes à Venise au Moyen Age, in Études d’histoire monétaire XIIe-XIXe siècles
cit., p. 213 Venice exported some 250,000 gold ducats, « sanza gli argienti », to Syria in 1399.
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impressive and beyond discussion. Almost completely overlooked in the
debate is that Europe also lost important quantities of silver in another
direction. Within the Baltic area Hanseatic merchants were reponsible for a
constant outflow of precious metal to the East. Silver coins but also bars of
silver disappeared for the purchase of specialised products on the Russian
markets. The silver that arrived in Russia found its way into the local
currency, was hoarded, or was used for the import of oriental luxury goods 49.
Most opponents to this theory do not deny the reduction of M in
absolute terms, but refer to a combination of factors that would have
curtailed most of its effects. First of all, a series of debasements in different
countries and regions expanded the money supply. Indeed, debasements
were always followed by huge mint outputs 50. To remedy the lack of
bullion, rulers and public authorities regularly ordered the compulsory
melting of golden and silver tableware, ornaments or even jewelry 51. Much
———————
A.M. STAHL, European Minting and the Balance of Payments with the Islamic World in the
Later Middle Ages, in Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico cit., p. 3, note 26
quotes figures for 1406-1431 from the Morosini Chronicle with the maximum figures ranging
between 500,000 and 600,000 ducats and an average of some 330,000 ducats exported by
Venetian galleys mainly to Beirut and Alexandria. As M. Balard, A. Stahl, J. Munro and others
have observed, the export of specie was conducted not only by galleys but also by round-
bottomed coche or cogs. Taking into account exports by both galleys and cogs and using data
by Ashtor for the end of the fifteenth century Professor Munro estimates Venetian export
for both gold and silver at a maximum of some 18,800 kg (J. MUNRO, South German Silver
cit., p. 10). Many of these estimates suffer from a certain confusion as they were made by
observers at the time mixing up net export of specie with combined values of both export of
specie and merchandise. This explains why Professor Lane estimated total Venetian exports of
specie to the Levant between very large limits, fluctuating between some 200,000 and 600,000
ducats (F.C. LANE, Exportations vénitiennes d’or et d’argent de 1200 à 1450, in Études d’histoire
monétaire XIIe-XIXe siècles cit., pp. 38 and 41, table I), a figure also used by M. BALARD, Les
relations économiques cit., p. 8.
49 A. ATTMAN, The Bullion Flow between Europe and the East 1000-1750, Göteborg 1981
(Acta Regiae Societatis Scientiarum et Litterarum Gothoburgensis, 20), p. 65; M. NORTH,
Geldumlauf und Wirtschaftskonjunktur im südlichen Ostseeraum an der Wende zur Neuzeit
(1440-1570), Sigmaringen 1990 (Kieler Historische Studien, 35), pp. 118-119.
50 This is clearly shown by many authors, but most recently in a controversial article by
A.J. ROLNICK, F.R. VELDE and W.E. WEBER, The Debasement Puzzle: an Essay on Medieval
Monetary History, in « The Journal of Economic History », 56/4 (1996), pp. 790, 793, 794-795,
795, 797, 806.
51 A.J. ROLNICK, F.R. VELDE and W.E. WEBER, The Debasement Puzzle cit., p. 792.
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more important, however, is the argument of the population fall because of
the combined effects of famine, plague and warfare. In 1300 or on the eve
of the Black Death Europe probably had a population of 70 to 73.5 million.
By the end of the century, this number was fallen to 42 or 45 million 52.
Postan and other Malthusian historians have argued that this drastic
depopulation process of at least 35% and even 40% must have increased the
relative money supply, i.e. the proportion of silver per head. As such, « a fall
in population would counteract the effects of falling supplies from the
mines ». Postan and others have also contended that the output of bullion
in the thirteenth century exceeded by far the needs of the money economy
at that time. By 1300 or 1320 the sizes of these « accumulated stocks of
bullion relative to annual increments from mining » 53 « must have been truly
enormous » 54. Since the stocks were immediately available to be used in the
monetary circulation, they would have largely compensated for the lower
output figures of the mines.
All of these objections have been more or less succesfully refuted by
monetary historians. Debasements expanded the amount of currency in
circulation only for a little while; in the longer run they drained even more
the bullion supplies 55. When bullion was scarce, all kinds of objects were
indeed brought to the mint, not only in the late Middle Ages 56, but such
extreme measures failed to solve the secular problem of the bullion famine.
Moreover, if one takes into account these relatively modest amounts that
———————
52 J.C. RUSSELL, Late Ancient and Medieval Population, in « Transactions of the American
Philosophical Society », New Series, 48/3 (1958), p. 148, table 152; ID., Population in Europe
500-1500, in The Fontana Economic History of Europe, ed. C.M. CIPOLLA, I, The Middle Ages,
London 1977, 4th print, p. 36, table I and p. 40; B.H. SLICHER VAN BATH, The Agrarian History
of Western Europe, AD 500-1850, London 1966, p. 87; J.A. VAN HOUTTE, Europäische Wirtschaft
und Gesellschaft von den großen Wanderungen bis zum Schwarzen Tod, in Handbuch der
Europäische Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, ed. H. KELLENBENZ, II, Europäische Wirtschafts-
und Sozialgeschichte im Mittelalter, Stuttgart 1980, pp. 16 and 18.
53 M.M. POSTAN, Note cit., p. 78, note 1.
54 M. Postan as quoted by N.J. MAYHEW, Numismatic Evidence cit., p. 2.
55 H.A. MISKIMIN, Monetary Movements and Market cit., p. 479.
56 E. AERTS and E. VAN CAUWENBERGHE, Organisation und Technik der Münzherstellung
in den Südlichen Niederlanden während des Ancien Régime, in Die historische Metrologie in den
Wissenschaften, eds. H. WITTHÖFT, G. BINDING, F. IRSIGLER, I. SCHNEIDER and A. ZIMMERMAN,
St. Katharinen 1986 (Scripta Mercaturae Verlag), p. 348, note 37.
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were added to the currency, one must also accept that considerably larger
quantities of gold and silver were – so to speak – withdrawn from circulation
to be used for artistic purposes 57. In many cities, such as Genoa, this custom
led to a series of legislative regulations deploring that una grande quantitae
de moneta la quale se tegneria morta e occupa in vestimente e ioie 58. The
second objection concerns the decrease in population. Devastating depopu-
lation characterised the second half of the fourteenth century, but it remains
uncertain whether it increased the European per capita stock of bullion.
Recent figures for England suggest it did not. Despite the fall of population
from 2.5-3 million in 1351 to 2.5 or even 2 million in 1422, new estimates
of the English currency show a decrease of the money supply per capita from
5-7 shillings in 1351 to 1-2 shillings in 1422 59. For quite some time, the
belief in the existence of large accumulated stocks constituted a key element
in the theories defended by the real school. These reserves were supposed to
have been indestructible and everlasting. In the last thirty years, however,
historians have realised that the lifetime of a gold or silver piece was not
infinite 60 and that several factors contributed to the disappearance of entire
series of coins from circulation: apart from incidental events such as ship-
wrecks, coin hoards that were never retrieved and simple losses, there was
physical deterioration of the coins due to natural processes (wear and tear,
losses when reminting and melting down older coins) and fraudulent pratices
(such as clipping, cutting, filing, washing and sweating). Although it willl
———————
57 F. LECERCLE, L’or feint - Les paradoxes de l’or dans la théorie de la peinture, in A.
TOURNON and G.-A. PEROUSE, Or, monnaie, échange dans la culture de la Renaissance, Actes
du 9e Colloque International de l’Association ‘Renaissance, Humanisme, Réforme’ Lyon 1991,
Saint-Etienne 1994, pp. 187-197; J.H. MUNRO, Political Muscle in an Age of Monetary Famine: a
Review, in « Revue belge de Philologie et d’Histoire », 64/4 (1986), p. 746; R. VAN UYTVEN,
Splendour or Wealth: Art and Economy in the Burgundian Netherlands, in « Transactions of
the Cambridge Bibliographical Society », 10/2 (1992), p. 112.
58 Quoted by J. HEERS, Gênes au XVe siècle cit., p. 65. For the origins of this sumptuary
legislation that for Genoa started in the second half of the twelfth century, C. KOVESI KILLERBY,
Sumptuary Law in Italy, 1200-1500, Oxford 2002. For sumptuary acts in fourteenth-century
England: H.A. MISKIMIN, Monetary Movements and Market cit., p. 487.
59M. ALLEN, The volume of the English currency, 1158-1470, in « The Economic History
Review », 2nd Series, 54/4 (2001), p. 607.
60 C.C. PATTERSON, Silver Stocks and Losses in Ancient and Medieval Times, in « The
Economic History Review », 2nd Series, 25/2 (1972), pp. 202-235 (a very original approach
with rather arbitrary estimates).
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never be possible to calculate this kind of loss precisely 61, all available
evidence 62 tends to support the current theory that a considerable part of
the currency « vanished into thin air » 63.
In addition there are other factors in favour of the money theory.
Many historians still prefer to work with a very crude version of the
quantity theory by assuming that V and T remain unchanged 64. However,
« a sophisticated Quantity Theorist cannot be accused of believing that V is
a fundamental constant of nature » 65. Indeed V was important, probably
even more important than M 66. As J.K. Galbraith once put it « allowance
had to be made not only for the supply of money but for the rate at which
it was spent. Money that was spent immediately on its receipt obviously
had a different effect on prices from money that was stored away in the
mattress » 67. Research for the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
has demonstrated convincingly how an increase or decrease of V had a
serious impact on P 68. The behaviour of V explains why there is no such
———————
61 P. SPUFFORD, Money and its Use cit., p. 345.
62 For an overview of the results: E. AERTS, Metal Loss in the Monetary Circulation of the
Southern Low Countries (Fifteenth-Eighteenth Centuries). Sources and methods, in Studia His-
torica Œconomica. Liber alumnorum Herman Van der Wee, eds. E. AERTS a.o., Leuven 1993,
pp. 41-58.
63 As N.J. MAYHEW, Numismatic Evidence cit., p. 3, so elegantly put it.
64 E.g. W. LETWIN, Monetary Practice and Theory of the North American Colonies during
the 17th and 18th Centuries, in La Moneta nell’economia europea secoli XIII-XVIII, ed. V.
BARBAGLI BAGNOLI, Prato-Firenze, 1981 (Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F.
Datini” Prato. Atti delle “Settimane di studio” e altri Convegni, 7), p. 452, note 30; J. DAY,
The Fisher Equation cit., p. 112; R. METZ, Geld, Währung und Preisentwicklung cit., p. 225.
65 P. SAMUELSON in collaboration with P. TEMIN, Economics, Tokyo 1976 10, p. 287.
66 M. PERROY, A l’origine d’une économie cit., pp. 170 and 171; E. FOURNIAL, Histoire
monétaire de l’occident médiéval, Paris 1970, p. 117 writes « ce qui compte, en effet, c’est
moins l’importance du stock monétaire que la rapidité de la circulation du numéraire ». This
in contrast to the Cipolla-thesis which emphasizes the money supply (J.H. MUNRO, Wool,
Cloth and Gold cit., p. 17).
67 J.K. GALBRAITH, Money. Whence It Came, Where It Went, Harmondsworth 1976, p. 220.
68 A. CHABERT, Encore la révolution des prix au XVIe siècle, in « Annales, Économies,
Sociétés, Civilisations », 12/2 (1957), pp. 269-274; J.A. GOLDSTONE, Monetary versus Velocity
Interpretations of the “Price Revolution”: A Comment, in « The Journal of Economic History »,
51/1 (1991), pp. 176-181; E. KERRIDGE, Trade and Banking in Early Modern England, Man-
chester 1988; J.C. RILEY and J.J. McCUSKER, Money Supply, Economic Growth, and the
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thing as a direct, linear or proportionate relation between M and P 69 and
why links between V and P can be stronger than between M and P. Precisely
because of this, it is advisable to use the Cambridge cash-balances version of
the Fisher equation which is, according to M. Friedman, both conceptually
and empirically more satisfactory. The Cambridge approach operates with
the income version of the classical quantity theory that tends to express the
variables in the Fisher equation in terms of income rather than in trans-
actions. M still represents the money stock but V is defined as the number of
times that the money stock is used in making income. T which is difficult to
quantify is replaced by y or the real national income in constant prices. In
addition, the variable k is introduced, which is the ratio of the money stock
to income. This ratio refers to the cash balances that are simply the amount
of money that people do not want to spend but desire to hold. Between the
cash balances and the income velocity of money there is an inverse
relation: in fact k is equal to the reciprocal of V (k = 1/V). Thus, the
Fisher equation may be safely rewritten as M = k P y 70.
Indeed, monetary historians do not believe that V remained constant.
Instead and for a variety of reasons, they accept a sharp drop in the velocity
in the late Middle Ages. Increasing hoarding and thesaurisation 71, especially
———————
Quantity Theory of Money: France, 1650-1788, in « Explorations in Economic History », 20
(1983), pp. 274-293; J.C. RILEY, Monetary Growth and Price Stability: France, 1650-1700, in
« Journal of Interdisciplinary History », 15/2 (1984), pp. 235-254; see also the remark by M.
MORINEAU in a conference discussion as published in La Moneta nell’economia, p. 155.
69 R. METZ, Geld, Währung und Preisentwicklung cit., p. XXXIV. See already the
opinion of F. Simiand as quoted by P. HARSIN, François Simiand 1873-1935, in P. HARSIN,
Recueil d’Études, Liège 1970, p. 109.
70 See M. FRIEDMAN, A Theoretical Framework for Monetary Analysis, New York-London
1971 (National Bureau of Economic Research Occasional Paper, 112), pp. 6-10 and Studies in
the Quantity Theory of Money, ed. M. FRIEDMAN, Chicago-London 1956. For the use of the
Cambridge approach, see E. AERTS, La circulation monétaire française aux XVIe et XVIIe
siècles, in « Revue Historique », CCLXXX/2 (1988), p. 398, J.H. MUNRO, Introduction, in his
Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies cit., p. X, and ID., Patterns of Trade cit., pp. 149-150.
71 P. SPUFFORD, Money and its Use cit., pp. 346-347; J.H. MUNRO, Monetary Contraction
and Industrial Change cit., p. 103; ID., Introduction, in his Bullion Flows and Monetary
Policies cit., p. XII. J. DAY, The Fisher Equation cit., p. 113 believes that V increased because
of rising military expenditures. I do not share his opinion. See, for example, the most recent
estimates (derived from estimates of M, P and T) of velocity in England: N.J. MAYHEW,
Population, Money Supply, and the Velocity of Circulation in England, 1300-1700, in « The
Economic History Review », 2nd Series, 48/2 (1995), p. 244, table I.
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among lower social groups, due to the generalised spread of warfare during
the fourteenth century, helped to increase k and decrease V. Rising trans-
action costs associated with growing insecurity and insafety, commercial
blockades and embargoes, the contraction of the number of transactions, of
exchanges and of trade in general 72 must also have depressed the turnover
of money. Finally, the general decline of income due to agricultural and
industrial crises led to declining investment and consumption, creating an
inverse multiplier effect whereby a decrease of consumption and investment
caused a more than proportionate decline of the overall income velocity of
money.
Again, supporters of the real theory evoked countervailing forces that
should explain why V during most of the the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries did not contract but probably expanded. One of these forces
would have been the spirit of “unbridled hedonism” that pushed people to
consume and to spend their cash balances 73. There is no reason whatsoever
to deny the traces of such an attitude among the wealthiest groups in late
medieval society 74. No less a person than the famous Giovanni Boccaccio
(1313-1375) observed how in Florence the outbreak of the plague (1348)
incited people to drink with an entire disregard of rule or measure (bevendo
senza modo e senza misure) and to satisfy their appetites with everything they
could (sodisfare d’ogni cosa all’appetito che si potesse) 75. However, manifes-
tations of excessive and even conspicuous consumption remained limited to
the more affluent groups. Their luxurious way of life temporarily enhanced
income velocity but was simultaneously responsible for the purchase and
import of non-European products, thus aggravating the outflow of precious
———————
72 J.H. MUNRO, The ‘New Institutional Economics’ and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in
Medieval and Early Modern Europe: the Textile Trades, Warfare and Transaction Costs, in
« Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte », 88/1 (2001), pp. 1-47.
73 H.A. MISKIMIN, Monetary Movements and Market cit., pp. 486-488; ID., Money and
Money Movements in France and England at the End of the Middle Ages, in Precious Metals in
the Later Medieval cit, pp. 79-96.
74 Well documented support for this thesis is given by, among others, J. HEERS, Gênes
au XVe siècle cit., p. 65, note 2; J.H. MUNRO, Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction cit., p.
104, note 23 and p. 108, note 36, and by R. VAN UYTVEN, Splendour or Wealth cit., p. 104.
75 A documentary history of modern Europe, eds. T.G. BARNES and G.D. FELDMAN Wa-
shington D.C. 1979, I, pp. 29-33; J.M. RIGG, The Decameron of Giovanni Boccaccio, London
1921, introduction to the first day (prima giornata, introduzione), vs 21.
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bullion. Moreover, hedonistic spending does not contradict hoarding and
thesaurisation 76. Apart from different social groups having been involved in
both phenomena, all authors refer to the “wide extremes” and “sharp
contrasts” 77 of the highly polarised society 78. Did bank money increase
monetary velocity? M. Postan, J. Hatcher, J.L. Bolton and others have cor-
rectly assumed that the use of credit instruments became more widespread
and more sophisticated in the fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth
centuries 79. In addition to the generalised use of different types of bills of
exchange (including cambio secco, cambio fittizio and ricorsa or cambium-
recambium) 80, there was the expansion of local deposit and transfer banks
such as the banchi del giro, banchi de tapeto, banchi di scritta or banchi de
scripta 81. In such banks, payments were usually made not in specie but by
transfers between accounts. Most banks also allowed regular customers
overdrafts on the conto currente and invested a part of the deposits by using
the principle of the fractional reserve. So by many means they created bank
money, credit and increased velocity 82. Still, the effects of these so-called
———————
76 See note 71.
77 J.H. MUNRO, Economic Depression and the Arts in the Fifteenth-Century Low Countries,
in « Renaissance and Reformation », 19 (1983), pp. 238 and 240.
78 R. VAN UYTVEN, Splendour or Wealth cit., p. 105.
79 M. POSTAN, The Medieval Economy cit., p. 268; M.M. POSTAN, Note cit., p. 78; M.
PERROY, A l’origine d’une économie cit., p. 171. For the works of Hatcher and Bolton: P.
NIGHTINGALE, Monetary Contraction and Mercantile Credit in Later Medieval England, in
« The Economic History Review », 2nd Series, 43/4 (1990), p. 560, notes 6 and 7.
80 For an overview see E. AERTS, La lettre de change sur la place financière de Bruges à la
fin du Moyen Age, in À la bourse. Histoire du marché des valeurs en Belgique de 1300 à 1990,
ed. G. DE CLERCQ, Paris - Louvain-la-Neuve 1992, pp. 33-47 and 442-444.
81 R. DE ROOVER, Early Banking before 1500 and the Development of Capitalism, in
« International Review of the History of Banking », 4 (1971), pp. 2-5; R. DE ROOVER, New
Interpretations of the History of Banking, in « Journal of World History », 2 (1954-1955), pp.
51-55; M. NORTH, Die Hanse und das europäische Zahlungssystem: Kreditpraktiken im inter-
nationalen Vergleich, in Vergleichende Ansätze in der hansischen Geschichtsforschung, ed. R.
HAMMEL-KIESOW, Trier 2002 (Hansische Studien, 13), p. 150; W. VON STROMER, Funktion
und Rechtsnatur der Wechselstuben als Banken, in « Bankhistorisches Archiv. Zeitschrift für
Bankengeschichte », 1 (1979), pp. 3-34.
82 R. DE ROOVER, Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges. Italian Merchant-
Bankers, Lombards and Money-Changers. A Study in the Origins of Banking, Cambridge
(Mass.) 1948 (The Mediaeval Academy of America, 51), pp. 283 and especially 320.
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innovations in banking, credit and international finance must not to be
overestimated. Successive bank failures and repeated ‘runs’ on the local banks
limited the expansion of moneta di banco 83. Outside of Italy such banks
were only found in major urban centres and were almost completely absent
in great parts of Europe, including England and a large area within the
Hanseatic world 84. Even in the great commercial cities, only some 10% of the
male population at most had a bank account 85. The same argument holds
for the late medieval bills of exchange, which were restricted to a piazza di
cambio and to a very small group of wealthy, chiefly Italian merchant-
bankers 86. Even in Bruges, the leading piazza di cambio and commercial
capital of northern Europe, the bill of exchange was by no means the only
or even the most popular financial document used in commercial circles 87.
Although J. Munro has shown that English merchants used bills of exchange
———————
83 P. SPUFFORD, Money and its Use cit., p. 347.
84 R. DE ROOVER, The Commercial Revolution of the Thirteenth Century, in Enterprise
and Secular Change. Readings in Economic History, eds. F.C. LANE and J.C. RIEMERSMA,
Homewood Ill. 1953, p. 82. This absence explains why England in 1436 managed to realise a
major breakthrough in the development of modern negotiability: see the work by J.H.
MUNRO, The International Law Merchant and the Evolution of Negotiable Credit in Late-
Medieval England and the Low Countries, in Banchi pubblici, banchi privati e monti di pietà
nell’Europa preindustriale. Amministrazione, technice operative e ruoli economici. Atti del conve-
gno Genova, 1-6 ottobre 1990 (« Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria », n.s., XXXI/1-2,
1991), pp. 71-75; Die Anfänge der Übertragbarkeit: einige Kreditinnovationen im Englisch-
Flämischen Handel des Spätmittelalters (1360-1540), in Kredit im Spätmittelalterlichen und
Frühneuzeitlichen Europa, ed. M. NORTH, Cologne-Vienna 1991, pp. 57-60; English “Back-
wardness” and Financial Innovations in Commerce with the Low Countries, 14th to 16th
Centuries, in International Trade in the Low Countries (14th-16th Centuries). Merchants,
Organisation, Infrastructure. Proceedings of the International Conference Ghent-Antwerp, 12th-
13th January 1997, eds. P. STABEL, B. BLONDÉ and A. GREVE, Leuven-Apeldoorn 2000, pp.
142-150; The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution: Usury, Rentes, and Negotiability,
in « The International History Review », XXV/3 (2003), p, pp. 547-549, 551, 552, 562.
85 P. SPUFFORD, W. WILKINSON and S. TOLLEY, Handbook of Medieval Exchange, London
1986, p. XXX; P. SPUFFORD, Money and its Use cit., p. 396, note 1. See also E. AERTS, Prof. R.
de Roover and Medieval Banking History, in « Revue de la Banque », 8/9 (1980), p. 259 and D.
NICHOLAS, The Metamorphosis of a Medieval City. Ghent in the Age of the Arteveldes, 1302-
1390, Leiden 1987, p. 129.
86 R. DE ROOVER, Early Banking before 1500 cit., p. 7; J.H. MUNRO, Patterns of Trade
cit., p. 153.
87 J. MURRAY, Bruges, Cradle of Capitalism, 1280-1390, Cambridge 2005, pp. 230 and 236.
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more widely than was thought by R. De Roover 88, other regions in Europe
were much more conservative 89 and used transerable bonds called letters
obligatory, the direct ancestor of the promissory notes. Like bills of
exchange, these documents were not negotiable, and their circulation was
rather limited before their systematic endorsement and discounting in later
centuries 90. All specialists agree that bank money was not able to com-
pensate for the scarcity of specie 91. In the medieval economy the « money
supply was the supply of metallic coin with only insignificant exceptions » 92.
Moreover, P. Nightingale has presented clear evidence of how a drastic
drop in mint outputs and a growing scarcity of coins led to a serious credit
contraction at the end of the fourteenth century 93.
The result of the debate during the last decades is that the money
supply in the course of the fourteenth century was declining to the point
where contemporary observers could no longer fail to notice the shortage
of bullion. Not only did men die, coins died as well 94.
———————
88 J.H. MUNRO, Die Anfänge der Übertragbarkeit cit., pp. 45-46.
89 M. NORTH, Die Hanse und das europäische Zahlungssystem cit., pp. 145 and 147.
90 H. VAN DER WEE, Monetary, Credit and Banking Systems, in The Cambridge Economic
History of Europe cit., V, pp. 324 and 325.
91 « Contrairement à l’opinion courante, les instruments de crédit et les ordres de
paiement ... n’étaient pas susceptibles, avant la diffusion de la pratique d’endossement et
d’escompte vers le milieu du XVIIe siècle, de suppléer à l’inélasticité d’une circulation
métallique » (J. DAY, “Crise du féodalisme” cit., p. 307). See also J.H. MUNRO, Wool, Cloth
and Gold cit., p. 15; ID., Monetary Contraction and Industrial Change cit., p. 103; ID., Bullion
Flows and Monetary Contraction cit., p. 108.
92 P. SPUFFORD, W. WILKINSON and S. TOLLEY, Handbook of Medieval Exchange cit., p. XXX.
93 P. NIGHTINGALE, Monetary Contraction and Mercantile Credit in Later Medieval En-
gland, in « The Economic History Review », 2nd Series, 43/4 (1990), pp. 560-575; ID., England
and the European depression of the mid-fifteenth century, in Journal of European Economic
History, 26, 1997, pp. 631-656.
94 To use the expression of the late David Herlihy. See the quotation by J.H. MUNRO,
Monetary Contraction and Industrial Change cit., p. 99 and the same, Bullion Flows and Mone-
tary Contraction cit., p. 100. N. SUSSMAN, The Late Medieval Bullion Famine Reconsidered, in
« The Journal of Economic History », 58/1 (1998), pp. 126-154 has argued on theoretical
grounds, applying the monetary approach to the balance of payments, that Europe could not
have suffered a deficit in its balance with the Near East and a bullion famine simultaneously: a
shortage of money implied an increasing demand for money, creating a surplus on the balance
and an inflow of money. This reasoning is correct but only if one accepts the assumptions of
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3. The Chronology of the Monetary Famine in Europe and in Genoa
It is not easy to map more or less precisely the spread of the late
medieval monetary famine in Europe. Miskimin has already warned us
about sharp variations of the money stock between different countries 95.
Even in one country there were regional differences in the various mint
outputs 96. The older supporters of a bullion famine thesis (such as W.C.
Robinson) believed that the monetary contraction started very soon in the
fourteenth century 97. Mayhew’s figures regarding English currency showed
a sharp fall in the first half of the century 98. Allen’s new estimates specified
that the decline occurred between 1320 and 1330 (see figure I with poly-
nomial trend). Since some gold output needs to be added to the figure for
1330, it may well be possible that the real decline started just after 1330 99.
The oldest complaints of a scarcity of silver in different regions in France
are recorded in the first half of the fourteenth century, but some mines
already had a serious output decline at the end of the thirteenth century 100.
Attempts to open new mines met with very uneven success. “The first
signs” of local and transitory scarcity of silver coins everywhere in Europe
appear in the middle of the century 101. Still, however alarming these
warnings may have been, many mints in different parts of Europe managed
———————
the approach. In other theoretical models, an increasing demand for money may be easily
associated with a deficit in the balance and an outflow of money.
95 H.A. MISKIMIN, Le problème de l’argent au Moyen Age, in « Annales, Economies, So-
ciétés, Civilisations », 17/4 (1962), p. 1129 (this study has been reprinted in his Cash, Credit
and Crisis in Europe, 1300-1600, Aldershot-Brookfield 1989, Variorum Collected Studies
Series, 289, n. IV).
96 As clearly shown by N. SUSSMAN, The Late Medieval Bullion Famine cit., pp. 144 and 151.
97 M. PERROY, A l’origine d’une économie cit., p. 170.
98 N.J. MAYHEW, Numismatic Evidence cit., pp. 7 and 9, fig.1.
99 M. ALLEN, The volume of the English cit., p. 603, table I and p. 607, table II. This
beginning coïncides with the first ordinances to prevent the export of coin and bullion (H.A.
MISKIMIN, Monetary Movements and Market cit., pp. 473 and 474).
100 E. FOURNIAL, Histoire monétaire de l’occident cit., p. 113. The best and most recent
evidence has been recorded by M.-C. BAILLY-MAÎTRE and P. BENOIT, Les mines d’argent de la
France médiévale, in L’argent au moyen âge. XXVIIIe Congrès de la S.H.M.E.S., Clermont-
Ferrand, 30 mai-1er juin 1997, Paris 1998 (Série Histoire Ancienne et Médiévale, 51), pp. 37
and 38.
101 P. SPUFFORD, Money and its Use cit., p. 348.
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to achieve huge output figures in the 1350s and 1360s. Therefore, it seems
safer to start the period of a lasting and long-run silver shortage somewhere
in the 1370s. Both P. Spufford and J. Day even believe that growing scarcity
took the shape of a grim famine only in the 1390s 102. New – although still
incomplete – evidence for France shows that silver mint output did not
start to decline from 1390, as believed by Day, but rather from c. 1370 and
then again from c. 1390 (see figure II with again a polynomial trend with a
much lower coefficient of determination) 103. This coïncides more or less
with the findings by J. Munro, who discovered a major monetary con-
traction in both England and the Low Countries from from about 1370 to
the 1470s 104. Part of Munro’s meticulous calculations for Flanders and the
Low Countries are summarised in figure III 105. The chronology also seems
applicable to at least an important part of northern Europe. After 1370, the
trend in the silver production of the mint in Lübeck was definitely
decreasing and the income from the mint in Hamburg also showed a similar
pattern after 1373 106.
In the light of the available evidence, Italy seems to fit better in the
chronology as suggested by Day 107. Major cities in the north experienced a
serious shortage of bullion from 1390 on and were forced to take a series of
measures to ease somewhat the monetary stringency on the markets. A
premium was offered for payments in cash, the official value of large silver
and gold coins was raised, inflow of bullion was promoted such as making
import duty-free, and strict embargo’s were proclaimed on the export of
coins and bullion. In Milan, the crisis was felt in 1391, and the sudden
———————
102 P. SPUFFORD, Money and its Use cit., p. 349. J. DAY, “Crise du féodalisme” cit., p. 312
and the same, The Question of Monetary Contraction cit., p. 15 sees 1395 as the start of the
bullion famine.
103 N. SUSSMAN, The Late Medieval Bullion Famine, pp. 135 and 136, table I. Those who
want to compare figures I and II should be aware that figure I estimates total currency in
circulation while figure II shows only mint outputs.
104 J.H. MUNRO, Introduction, in his Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies cit., p. XI; ID.,
Monetary Contraction and Industrial Change cit., pp. 104, 139, table 2 and 149, table 10; ID.,
Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction cit., pp. 121, 136-147, tables 4-9.
105 Based on Ibidem, p. 144, table 8.
106 M. NORTH, Geldumlauf und Wirtschaftskonjunktur cit., p. 111, table 30 and p. 114,
table 31.
107 What follows is largely based on J. DAY, The Great Bullion Famine cit., pp. 23-32.
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decline of bullion stocks caused serious monetary and economic difficulties.
The crisis lasted at least until the 1420s with the years 1409-1410 as the
high point. In Florence, silver minting ceased in 1392 and was recommen-
ced only ten years later. Output in the early fifteenth century must have
been on a much lower level than in the fourteenth century 108. Venice was in
a more comfortable position as the Venetian merchants had access to some
rich silver mines in Central Europe and the Balkans 109. But even Venice
turned out not to be immune for the bullion dearth when silver extraction
in Serbian and Bosnian mines stopped at the end of the 1420s or in the
early 1430s and when, as we have seen, these mines were seized by Otto-
man Turks a few years later 110. As A. Stahl, the specialist on the Venetian
Zecca recently reported, the volume of minting, especially for silver,
declined in the first half of the fifteenth century 111.
For Genoa the crisis can be followed from the output of the zecca or
the local mint. In the case of the Genoese mint, one must keep in mind that
not all documents have been preserved and that most of the data are derived
indirectly from balance sheets containing profits (ricavi) and costs (costi) 112.
Still they represent « a reliable index of the movement of stocks » 113 and
probably provide the best quantitative evidence available at present for the
money supply. Figure IV presents the official value in lire of the mint
output in Genoa between 1341 and 1450 114 and shows that, in terms of
money of account, output started to decline from about 1370 and stayed
low until 1415. The same pattern can be seen in figure V with respect to the
production of larger coins like the gold genovini and silver grossi 115. An
———————
108 A.M. STAHL, European Minting and the Balance cit., fig. 4.
109 L.B. ROBBERT, Money and Prices in Thirteenth-Century Venice, in « Journal of Medieval
History », 20 (1994), pp. 373-390; F.C. LANE, Exportations vénitiennes d’or cit., p. 35.
110 E. ASHTOR, Les métaux précieux et la balance cit., pp. 41-42; P. SPUFFORD, Money and
its Use cit., pp. 333 and 349-350.
111 M. STAHL, European Minting and the Balance cit., p.2.
112 G. FELLONI, Ricavi e costi della zecca di Genova dal 1341 al 1450, in ID., Scritti di
storia economica (« Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria », n.s., XXXVIII/1-2, 1998), I, p.
538. Scattered information is given by J. DAY, The Great Bullion Famine cit., pp. 28-29.
113 J. DAY, The Question of Monetary Contraction cit., p. 15.
114 Based on the figures by G. FELLONI, Ricavi e costi della zecca cit., pp. 549 and 550.
115 Ibidem.
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estimate of total output of both gold and silver coins also confirms the
hypothesis that the first bullion famine can be traced in Genoa between
about 1370 and 1415 (figure VI) 116.
Most of the evidence for the monetary famine is based on output
figures calculated or estimated from documents kept by the mint work-
shops. It should be stressed that estimates of money supply are, of course,
not that same as coinage statistics. A number of variables explain why the
relationship between monetary circulation and minting activity could differ
substantially 117. Estimates of currency in circulation, combining output
data and coin hoards, may remedy this imperfection. Unfortunately, such
estimates usually remain isolated snapshots, as it were, of a given moment,
and do not provide an insight into the diachronic evolution. With this
serious reservation, the few estimates confirm the general picture and show
a substantial decrease of the total currency in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries 118.
Finally, the first great bullion famine at the end of the fourteenth and
the beginning of the fifteenth century was not confined to the European
continent. Its undulations also reached the Near East (Egypt, Syria) and
were even felt in China 119.
———————
116 Figure VI is based on data provided by J. DAY, The Question of Monetary Contraction
cit., p. 23, table 1.
117 J. DAY, The Question of Monetary Contraction cit., p. 14; J.H. MUNRO, Bullion
Flows and Monetary Contraction cit., pp. 98, 109, 112; A.M. STAHL, European Minting and
the Balance cit., p. 2, and especially N.J. MAYHEW, Population, Money Supply cit., pp. 241
and 242.
118 M. ALLEN, The volume of the English cit., p. 607, table 2 and p. 608, fig. 1; N.J. MAYHEW,
Numismatic Evidence cit., p. 7, table 2 and p. 9, figure 1 for England in the fourteenth century;
E. AERTS and H. VAN DER WEE, The Leuven Coin Find of 1851 and the Currency of the
Burgundian Netherlands in the Middle of the 15th Century: a Case Study, Leuven 1980 (Post-
graduate Workshop on Quantitative Economic History. Mimeographed Discussion Paper
80.03) and E. AERTS, Der Geldumlauf der Burgundischen Niederlande in der Mitte des 15.
Jahrhunderts. Ein Quantitativer Versuch, in Geldumlauf, Währungssysteme cit., pp. 25-44 for
the Southern Low Countries in the fifteenth century.
119 E. ASHTOR, Les métaux précieux et la balance cit., pp. 44 and 102; M. CARTIER, Mesure de
la valeur et structure des prix dans la Chine médiévale et pré-moderne, in Études d’histoire
monétaire XIIe-XIXe siècles cit., p. 154.
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4. The Monetary Famine and the Bank of the Casa di San Giorgio
I do not intend here to describe and explain the origins of the famous
Casa and Bank of San Giorgio. Other, more qualified, authors have already
demonstrated convincingly that the beginnings of the bank may be linked
to the radical reform of Genoa’s public debt after the last great war with
Venice 120. With this conversion or rather consolidation, a great number of
different debts were grouped together and placed with a reduced interest
rate under the protection of the city’s patron, San Giorgio. Creditors and
compere (“purchases”, meaning loans to the city government) were united
into one consortium to which a certain amount of tax revenue was
assigned: the Casa or Officium comperarum et bancorum Sancti Georgii.
Formally established by decree of the French governor of Genoa on 18
January 1408, « la plus puissante institution financière de l’Occident » 121 and
« a landmark in the fiscal history of Europe » 122 opened its doors on 2
March 1408 123. Apart from this major explanation, the hypothesis has been
proposed that the prevailing bullion shortage also had some influence 124.
Can the origins of the Casa di San Giorgo be associated with the declining
———————
120 E.g. G. FELLONI, Il banco di San Giorgio ed il suo archivio: una memoria a più valenze,
in ID., Scritti di storia economica cit., I, pp. 461-468; ID., I primi banchi pubblici della Casa di
San Giorgio (1408-45), in Banchi pubblici, banchi privati e monti di pietà nell’Europa preindu-
striale. Amministrazione, tecniche operative e ruoli economici. Atti del convegno Genova 1-6
ottobre 1990 (« Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria », n.s. XXXI/1-2, 1991), pp. 225-246,
reprinted in his Scritti di storia economica cit., pp. 603-621; E. MARRENGO, Il banco di San
Giorgio, Genova 1911; D. GIOFFRÈ, Il debito pubblico genovese. Inventario delle Compere ante-
riori a San Giorgio o non consolidate nel Banco, Milano 1967; J. HEERS, Gênes au XVe siècle cit.,
pp. 97 and 110-112; H. SIEVEKING, Studio sulle finanze genovesi nel Medioevo e in particolare
sulla Casa di S. Giorgio, in « Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria », XXXV/1-2 (1905-1906),
the original German version was published in Freiburg, 1898-1899. Most useful is the BSFI
(Bibliografia di Storia della Finanza Italiana) by G. De Lucca and A. Moioli (Dipartimento di
Storia della società e delle istituzioni, Università degli Studi di Milano).
121 J. HEERS, Gênes au XVe siècle cit., p. 110.
122 According to Professor Epstein in the best and most recent general synthesis of
Genoese history: S.A. EPSTEIN, Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528, Chapel Hill NC 2001, preface.
123 G. FELLONI, I primi banchi pubblici cit., pp. 604 and 611; ID., Strumenti tecnici ed
istituzioni bancarie a Genova nei secc. XV-XVIII, in ID., Scritti di storia economica cit., I, pp.
641 and 644.
124 G. FELLONI, Banca privata e banchi pubblici a Genova nei secoli XII-XVIII, in ID.,
Scritti di storia economica cit., I, p. 598; ID., I primi banchi pubblici, pp. 603 and 604.
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money supply? Indeed, many authors have made an explicit link between
money supply and credit institutions. Following R. De Roover, J. Day has
contended that, because of the inelastic supply of metallic circulation, a sharp
reduction of the precious metal stock was accompanied by an extension or
at least by attempts at an extension of the amount of bank money 125. Clearly
the shortage of metallic coin and credit « and that at all levels » 126 must have
had its effects in Genoa.
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the town was a major com-
mercial and financial centre with a famous secular tradition in banking, star-
ting already in the twelfth century 127. Numerous commercial and financial
innovations, taking shape within urban institutions and commercial groups
sooner than elsewhere in Italy, had contributed to Genoa’s golden age in
the thirteenth century 128. Before the Black Death, the city had a population of
some 54,000. After the plague, in the years 1350-1354, the urban population
was reduced to some 35,000 and probably still fluctuated around that level
in 1400. According to J. Heers, the population figure then again increased
to more than 85,000 in the middle of the fifteenth century 129. Around 1400,
the demographic size of the town was comparable to that of Barcelona,
Bruges, London or Rouen. Numerous local campsores e bancheri, of course,
did what their name suggested – changed money – but, following the example
———————
125 J. DAY, “Crise du féodalisme” cit., pp. 307-308. Other examples of the link between
bullion flows and credit in ID., Money and Credit in Medieval and Renaissance Italy, in ID.,
The Medieval Market Economy, Oxford 1987, pp. 146-147 and P. NIGHTINGALE, Monetary
Contraction and Mercantile, pp. 560-575.
126 P. SPUFFORD, Money and its Use cit., p. 348.
127 R. DE ROOVER, Early Banking before 1500 cit., p. 2; G. FELLONI, Banca privata e
banchi pubblici cit., pp. 584-586; ID., Ricchezza privata, credito e banche: Genova e Venezia nei
secc. XII-XIV, in Genova, Venezia, il Levante nei secoli XII-XIV, Atti del convegno interna-
zionale di studi, Genova-Venezia, 10-14 marzo 2000, a cura di G. ORTALLI e D. PUNCUH,
Genova-Venezia 2001 (« Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria », n.s., XLI/1; edito anche
dall’Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, Venezia), pp. 308 and 309.
128 A. GREIF, On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution:
Genoa during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, in « The Journal of Economic History »,
54/2 (1994), pp. 283 and 284.
129 G. FELLONI, Ricchezza privata, credito cit., p. 296; ID., Struttura e movimenti dell’eco-
nomia genovese tra Due e Trecento: bilanci e prospettive di ricerca, in ID., Scritti di storia econo-
mica cit., II, p. 971; J. HEERS, Gênes au XVe siècle cit., pp. 44 and 45.
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of the cambiatori in other progressive cities in Italy and elsewhere 130, they
also performed genuine banking functions. They accepted cash deposits,
developed transfer banking by making current transfers between accounts
of customers (giri di partite), were involved in maritime insurance, advanced
loans, conducted financial operations for the city government and traded in
bullion, which they also delivered to the mint 131. The profession was
completely free and was not bound by any corporative association. This
and also, of course, the financial opportunities explain their high number:
13 in 1340, 30 between 1356-1358, and 21 in 1390-1391 132.
As a direct result of the European bullion famine, Genoa like many
other places in Europe at the end of the fourteenth century, witnessed a
progressive dearth of precious metal (see section III and figures IV, V and
VI). Silver, in particular, was difficult to find. Unlike its arch-enemy Venice
Genoa did not have access to large silver supplies. The territory itself had
no mines and later attempts to exploit mineral veins in the Ligurian
Apennines were not very succesful. Some silver was found in Cologne and
in Spain (the region of Carthagena and Murcia) while bags and sacks with
small silver pieces (blanchae) were imported from Seville, Cadiz, Malaga and
Valencia 133. But these inflows were not enough to meet the needs of trade
and business. This explains why African gold was regularly sold in Seville
and Cadiz in exchange for silver 134. In 1399, the importation of money over
———————
130 E. AERTS, Prof. R. de Roover and Medieval Banking cit.; pp. 255-256; W. BLOCKMANS,
Handelstechniken in Flandern und Brabant im Vergleich mit denjenigen der Hanse, 14.-15.
Jahrhundert, in Brügge-Colloquium des Hansischen Geschichtsvereins 26.-29. Mai 1988. Referate
und Diskussionen, ed. K. FRIEDLAND, Cologne-Vienna 1990, pp. 25-32; R. CARANDE, Comercío,
banca y crédito medievales según De Roover, in « Moneda y Credito. Revista de Economia », 40
(1952), pp. 20-22; R.A. GOLDTHWAITE, Local Banking in Renaissance Florence, in « The Journal
of European Economic History », 14/1 (1985), pp. 5-55. See also the references quoted in
note 81.
131 G. FELLONI, Ricchezza privata, credito cit., pp. 313 and 314; J. HEERS, Gênes au XVe
siècle cit., pp. 91-95.
132 G. FELLONI, Ricchezza privata, credito cit., pp. 312 and 313.
133 J. HEERS, Gênes au XVe siècle cit., pp. 66, 70 and 71; ID., Les hommes d’affaires italiens en
Espagne au moyen âge: le marché monétaire, in ID., Société et économie à Gênes (XIVe-XVe
siècles), London 1979 (Variorum reprints), pp. 75 and 82.
134 J. HEERS, Portugais et Génois au XVe siècle; la rivalité atlantique-méditerranée, in ID.,
Société et économie, pp. 144 and 146.
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land was exempted from customs duties, followed in February 1400 by a
more general decree stipulating fiscal exemption for all imports of coins and
bullion. Both measures were intended to remedy the monetary scarcity in the
city (... volentes providere indigentie peccuniarum que nunc est in civitate ...) 135.
Encouraging the inflow of bullion appeared to be inadequate. Even a centre
of the entrepôt trade like Genoa needed bullionist chryshedonic legislation
to limit the outflow 136. This is why in January 1402 the government put a
ban on the export of all minted gold 137. The monetary famine affected
particularly the monete grosse, larger coins with a considerable purchasing
power, such as golden fiorini or genovini 138, ducati and scudi or silver grossi.
The growing scarcity of these coins resulted in a sharp increase of their
rates as expressed in monete piccole or small change with an intrinsic value
much less than their face value (such as sessini, soldi or soldini, denari mi-
nuti and their fractions) 139. This debasement of the monete piccole marked
an abrupt end to a period of remarkable monetary stability. Indeed, for
more than fifty years within the monetary and financial system of Genoa,
the golden fiorino had a stable exchange rate fixed at 300 denari or 25 soldi
or 12.5 grossi. J. Day and J. Heers explain this stability by the expansion of
bank money within the Genoese economy. Not only the numerous bankers
but also merchants themselves put current accounts in stable bank money,
called “good money”, at the disposal of a limited circle of clients 140. However,
the system was not capable of coping with a major crisis such as the lack of
precious metal in the decades from 1390/95 to 1415.
———————
135 J. DAY, Les douanes de Gênes, 1376-1377, Paris 1963 (École Pratique des Hautes Étu-
des. VIe section. Centre de Recherches Historiques. Ports, routes, trafics, 17), I, p. XII, note 5.
136 ID., The Question of Monetary Contraction cit., p. 19.
137 ID., Les douanes de Gênes cit., I, p. XIV, note 3.
138 One should not forget that « nella stessa patria del genovino si tenda a chiamare
“fiorino” la moneta locale d’oro ed a riservare il termine “genovino” al denaro di biglione » (!)
(G. FELLONI, Genova organizza la sua zecca e le sue monete cominciano a correre per il mondo,
in ID., Scritti di storia economica cit., I, p. 698).
139 ID., I primi banchi pubblici cit., pp. 603 and 611, note 15.
140 J. DAY, Les douanes de Gênes cit., I, p. XIII; ID., Money and Credit in Medieval and
Renaissance Italy, in ID., The Medieval Market Economy, Oxford 1987, p. 150; ID., Gênes au XVe
siècle cit., pp. 53 and 95.
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The monetary strettezza (stringency or tightness) implied a strong
demand for money, especially good money that was hard to find. Since
everyone wanted and needed his money, few were prepared to deposit, spend,
lend or invest. The creation and expansion of bank money ceased. Already
in September 1398, deposit bankers in Genoa had great difficulties in
paying cash (in pecunia numerata) to their depositors. The city government,
therefore, authorised them for one month to make a 4% charge on with-
drawals in cash to discourage people from collecting their money. A maxi-
mum amount was also stipulated for withdrawals in one day 141. As in other
places in Europe, the government and the public blamed the money-changers
and bankers for what was going wrong and accused them of exporting
bullion and selling it abroad for higher prices. People readily believed that
bankers were responsible for the continuous rise of the rates of the large
coins. Many thought that they also worsened the overall quality of some
coin types 142. Even historians such as R. De Roover assumed that bankers
and money-changers supported debasements since frequent debasement of
the currency would have favoured their business 143. But this thesis has been
seriously challenged 144.
Nevertheless that private bankers were forced to ask exorbitant discount
rates on heavy coins and, generally speaking, were powerless vis-à-vis the
forces of the money market, helps to explain the founding of a public city
bank. Genoa did not invent the idea but adopted a principle already applied in
Catalonia where the first public bank of Europe in the Middle Ages was
founded in Barcelona in 1401. This Taula de la Ciutat was very succesful, but
its imitation in Valencia in 1407 was not 145. Other places followed the
example of Barcelona, Valencia and Genoa or at least tried to provide a public
alternative to the private bankers 146. In Genoa, the bank was a kind of division
———————
141 J. DAY, Les douanes de Gênes cit., I, p. XIV; P. SPUFFORD, Money and its Use cit., p. 349.
142 R. DE ROOVER, Early Banking before 1500 cit., p. 5; G. FELLONI, I primi banchi pub-
blici cit., p. 604.
143 R. DE ROOVER, Money, Banking and Credit cit., pp. 188, 238-239, 318-319, 341, 350, 353.
144 E. AERTS, Prof. R. de Roover and Medieval cit., pp. 257-258.
145 Moneta, credito e banche in Europa: un millennio di storia, ed. G. FELLONI, Genova
1997, p. 116; H. VAN DER WEE, Monetary, Credit and Banking cit., p. 314.
146 E.g. a municipal exchange service (Stadtswechsel) as in Nuremberg in 1428 (W. VON
STROMER, Funktion und Rechtsnatur der Wechselstuben cit., p. 18).
—  57 —
or agency of the Casa. Its aim was to eliminate the premium on good large
coins by providing stable bank money guaranteed by the presence of virtually
all cash deposits at every moment. This was certainly not the case with private
banks. Bankers had learned that their daily business did not require all of the
deposits to be available at all times but that a fractional reserve of 20-30%
was sufficient 147. The rest of the deposits could be lent or invested. One of
the results of this was that a sudden run on a bank could never be answered
adequately. For the Banco di San Giorgio, as for other public banks, confi-
dence was of the utmost importance. Therefore, the charter of the bank
stipulated that no loans to private individuals or even overdrafts on current
accounts were permitted (nemo expenderet in dicto bancho ultra suum credi-
tum) 148. In pratice, exceptions were made for owners of shares (luoghi) in the
public debt. The bank developed the same bank functions as the private
bankers, accepting deposits and making tranfers between accounts. It also
dealt with luoghi and with the interest (paghe) on these shares. The situation
in Genoa was original in the sense that private bankers did not compete but
brought their deposits and cash reserves to the bank. There is ample evidence
for different private bankers to illustrate this thesis. A recent study on the
Lomellini bank shows clearly how Nicolò Lomellini between 1408 and
1419 used the Banco di San Giorgo quite frequently for deposits, transfers
and credit facilities 149. Since bank deposits and a great deal of the banking
operations in general came under the direct control of the urban authorities,
the confidence of the public increased rapidly. As such, the performance of
the Genoese public bank stood in sharp contrast with the Taula: in Barcelona
the bank acted as an instrument for the municipal treasury; in Genoa the bank
worked in the first place for private customers.
Italy’s first public bank ceased all activity in 1445 150. Private bankers
were left behind alone. But not all the lessons from the past were forgotten:
———————
147 J. DAY, Money and Credit in Medieval cit., p. 151; R. DE ROOVER, Money, Banking
and Credit cit., p. 318; ID., New Interpretations of the History cit., p. 52.
148 Quoted by J. DAY, Money and Credit in Medieval cit., p. 150.
149 G. FELLONI, Nicolò Lomellini: un banchiere genovese degli Alberti, in La vita e il mondo
di Leon Battista Alberti, Atti del convegno internazionale di studi, Genova 19-21 febbraio 2004,
in corso di stampa.
150 G. FELLONI, L’archivio della Casa di San Giorgio di Genoa (1407-1805) ed il suo
ordinamento, in ID., Scritti di storia economica cit., I, p. 455; ID., I primi banchi pubblici cit., p.
604; ID., Strumenti tecnici ed istituzioni cit., p. 642.
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in 1447 and 1448 the city administration for the first time required the private
bankers to have deposits of caution money so that customers could always
be paid in periods of liquidity crises 151.
5. Conclusions
A complex set of variables explains why Europe in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries was faced with cyclical movements in which metallic
coins were scarce. The first phase of such as “bullion famine” commenced in
1320 and was followed by a second in 1370 (the north) or 1390 (the south),
and a third and probably most serious one in 1440. Explanations for these
periodic collapses of the money supply were the declining output of Euro-
pean mines, the constant outflow of precious metal, and the sharp drop in
the velocity due to increased hoarding and thesaurisation. Although the
carestia di danari in major Italian towns was probably less serious than in
northwest Europe (England, France, Germany and the Low Countries) 152
even Italy did not escape the general European pattern. It is surprising,
however, how difficult it is to substantiate this late medieval bullion famine
for towns that were the most advanced in Europe’s economic history.
Indeed, the quantitative evidence for the local mint factories of Genoa or
Venice is of much poorer quality than for those in the north. From scattered
evidence it seems that the money supply in Genoa was already declining
from 1370 on, long before the decline started in Venice and even before
money became scarce in Milan and Florence. Genoa showed itself more
vulnerable than its rival Venice. The volume of Genoese trade and export
declined, the population in the second half of the fourteenth century
stagnated and the town lacked access to large silver supplies. A number of
measures were meant to remedy the scarcity: the importation of bullion of
coins was encouraged, the export restricted and the currency debased.
However, all those measures seemed inadequate when the situation
deteriorated at the end of the fourteenth century. During these last years of
the century, the creation of bank money was stopped; private bankers had
trouble finding cash and were blamed for losing their grip of the situation.
———————
151 J. HEERS, Gênes au XVe siècle cit., p. 58.
152 F.C. LANE, Exportations vénitiennes d’or cit., p.40. J. HEERS, Portugais et Génois cit.,
p. 145 even expresses doubts about a bullion scarcity in fifteenth-century Italy.
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In this context, the idea of a public bank controlling private bankers matured.
Developed from a specialised function within the famous Casa di San Gior-
gio, Genoa’s most important public institution, the Banco di San Giorgio
would soon answer to Machiavelli’s description of the Casa as a « state within
the state ». As with the Wisselbank of Amsterdam two centuries later, the
Banco provided stable bank money based on maximum confidence so that
problems with debased currency and floating exchange rates could be
avoided. Confidence was guaranteed since virtually all cash deposits were
present at all times. For quite a number of years the bank stabilised the
currency. When the bank closed its doors in 1445, a new period of severe
bullion shortage had just commenced. How the Genoese and the Genoese
economy managed to overcome this last medieval “monetary famine” is
another story.
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Figure I - Total silver currency in England (1290-1422)
Figure II - Total silver mint output in France (1362-1415)
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Figure III - Official value in money of account of mint output in Flanders
and the Low Countries (1335-1419)
Figure IV - Official value in money of account of mint output
in Genoa (1341-1450)
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Figure V - Weight of output of genovini and grossi in Genoa (1341-1450)
Figure VI - Level of mint output in gold and silver in Genoa (1341-1450)
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